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I. INTRODUCTION
Following the attacks of September 1 1th, Vice President Dick
Cheney appeared on NBC's "Meet the Press" and told the nation that the
new war may force the United States to go to "the dark side."' Many
recalled his statement when press reports revealed the existence of CIA-
run detention sites, or "black sites," where high-level detainees were held
and interrogated. 2 The reports raised several concerns, among them that
the CIA practices violated the Geneva Conventions. 3 The White House
did not then believe the Geneva Conventions applied to the detainees,
nor did it acknowledge CIA involvement in their detention.
4
Then, in the summer of 2006, the United States Supreme Court held
in Hamdan v. Rumsfeld 5 that the Geneva Conventions, and specifically
the provisions in Common Article 3, applied to the War on Terror. 6 The
decision worried government officials about potential exposure to
criminal liability for their role in the CIA program. 7  The Hamdan
decision led President Bush to publicly acknowledge the CIA prison
program and encourage Congress to clarify the country's obligations
under the Geneva Conventions, thereby ensuring continuation of the CIA8
program. This led to the eventual creation of the Military Commissions
Act (MCA).
9
1. Jane Mayer, A Deadly Interrogation, NEW YORKER, Nov. 14, 2005, at 44.
2. Dana Priest, CIA Holds Terror Suspects in Secret Prisons, WASH. POST, Nov. 2,
2005, at Al.
3. See, e.g., id. The Geneva Conventions are a series of four agreements between
participating countries which provide the primary source of the laws of war. Human
Rights Watch, Summary of International and US. Law Prohibiting Torture and Other Ill-
treatment of Persons in Custody, http://www.hrw.org/english/
docs/2004/05/24/usint8614.htm (last visited Apr. 15, 2007). The Third Geneva
Convention concerns the treatment of prisoners of war and pertains primarily to armed
conflicts between signatories of the Geneva Conventions. Geneva Convention relative to
the Treatment of Prisoners of War, art. 2, adopted Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3316, 75
U.N.T.S. 135. Common Article 3, so called because it is in all four Geneva Conventions,
pertains to treatment of civilians, detainees, and others in conflicts "not of an
international character." Id. art. 3 [hereinafter Common Article 3]. For further
discussion of the Geneva Conventions, see infra Part V.
4. See infra Part III.
5. 126 S. Ct. 2749 (2006).
6. Id. at 2759, 2794-96.
7. See, e.g., R. Jeffrey Smith, Worried CIA Officers Buy Legal Insurance, WASH.
POST, Sept. 11, 2006, at Al.
8. See President George W. Bush, Address to the Nation (Sept. 6, 2006), transcript
available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2006/09/
20060906-3.html [hereinafter Bush Address].
9. Press Release, Office of the Press Secretary, President Bush Signs Military
Commissions Act of 2006, (Oct. 17, 2006), available at http://www.
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This paper addresses whether the CIA detention and interrogation
practices exceeded the legal limits of Common Article 3 of the Geneva
Conventions. To do so, it is necessary to examine the language of
Common Article 3 and consider how it has been interpreted domestically
and internationally. 10 This paper will consider whether future operation
of the CIA program violates the U.S. Government's treaty obligations
under the Geneva Conventions.' 1 Despite enactment of the MCA, which
altered U.S. domestic laws, it is still pertinent to determine if the U.S. is
complying with its international obligations. 12
II. CIA PRACTICES REVEALED
On September 6, 2006, President Bush delivered a speech from the
East Room of the White House. 13  In his speech, President Bush
admitted that, in addition to housing suspected terrorists at the United
States Naval Base at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, a number of suspected
high-level terrorists have been held and questioned outside the United
States in secret prisons operated by the CIA.14 President Bush's speech
affirmed what press reports had previously disclosed.
In December 2004, a newspaper story first exposed the locations of
several secret prisons, or "black sites." 15 A second story later claimed
whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2006/10/20061017- l.html. See generally Military
Commissions Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-366, 120 Stat. 2600 (2006) (to be codified at
10 U.S.C. §§ 948a-950w).
10. See infra Parts III-IV.
11. See infra Part VI.
12. The MCA was intended to clarify the Geneva Conventions and amend the War
Crimes Act to allow the CIA to continue to operate prisons and interrogate prisoners. See
Bush Address, supra note 8. Regardless of the judicial enforceability of the Geneva
Conventions domestically, the U.S. Government has a duty to abide by the international
treaties to which it is a signatory and which are part of the law of war. United States v.
Noriega, 808 F. Supp. 791, 799 (S.D. Fla. 1992) ("[l~t is inconsistent with both the
language and spirit of the [Geneva Conventions] and with our professed support of its
purpose to find that the rights established therein cannot be enforced by the individual...
."); see also Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, art. 26, adopted May 22, 1969,
1155 U.N.T.S. 331 ("Pacta sunt servanda: Every treaty in force is binding upon the
Parties to it and must be performed by them in good faith"), available at
http://untreaty.un.org/
ilc/texts/instruments/english/conventions/1l1 1969.pdf.
13. See Bush Address, supra note 8.
14. Id. ("In addition to the terrorists held at Guantanamo, a small number of
suspected terrorist leaders and operatives captured during the war have been held and
questioned outside the United States, in a separate program operated by the Central
Intelligence Agency.").
15. Dana Priest & Scott Higham, At Guantanamo, a Prison Within a Prison, WASH.
POST, Dec. 17, 2004, at Al (identifying CIA prisons within the Guantanamo Bay facility,
2007] 1719
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that approximately thirty suspected terrorists were being held in the
prisons on a long-term basis, in almost complete isolation, in dark or
underground cells, and without contact to anyone outside the CIA.
16
Little was known outside these reports, including the locations of the
prison sites, the names of the prisoners, the details of their confinement,
or how decisions were made as to the length of a prisoner's
detainment. 17
Reports of harsh interrogation techniques and possible prisoner
deaths also began to surface. Prisoner abuse at Abu Ghraib, primarily a
military prison, was already well publicized at the time. 18 The reports of
the CIA's presence in the prison, among other things, led human rights
organizations to suspect and report alleged abuses in CIA prisons during
2004 and 2005.19 Press reports soon followed, including stories
concerning a few detainee deaths in CIA-run prisons.
20
President Bush responded in his 2006 speech by announcing that all
fourteen current prisoners being held in secret CIA prisons, among them
Khalid Sheikh Mohammed, Abu Zubaydah, and Ramzi bin al Shibh, had
been transferred to Guantanamo Bay.2 1  President Bush encouraged
Congress to pass the Military Commissions Bill, which provided certain
immunities to CIA interrogators to allow them to continue the
interrogation program, which he felt was invaluable to the War on
Terror.
2
on an off-limits corner of the Bagram air base in Afghanistan, on ships at sea, and on
Britain's Diego Garcia Island in the Indian Ocean).
16. Priest, supra note 2.
17. See Bush Address, supra note 8 ("Many specifics of this program, including
where the detainees have been held and the details of their confinement, cannot be
divulged."); Priest, supra note 2.
18. 60 Minutes II, on CBS, broke the Abu Ghraib story first in April 2004. CBS
News, Abuse of Iraqi POWs by GIs Probed, Apr. 28, 2004, http://www.
cbsnews.com/stories/2004/04/27/60II/main614063.shtml.
19. E.g., Press Release, Human Rights First, U.S. Holding Prisoners in More Than
Two Dozen Secret Detention Facilities Worldwide, New Report Says (June 17, 2004),
available at http://www.humanrightsfirst.org/media/2004_alerts/
0617.htm.
20. The first was a Washington Post report by Dana Priest, supra note 2. See also
Michael Hirsh & Mark Hosenball, The White House: The Politics of Torture, NEWSWEEK,
Sept. 25, 2006, at 32; Mayer, supra note 1.
21. Bush Address, supra note 8.
22. Id. President Bush stressed that he felt the program was very important for
gathering timely information in the War on Terror. Id. Initially the act was opposed by
Senators John McCain, Lindsey Graham, and John Warner, who suggested a different
plan. See Carl Hulse, An Unexpected Collision, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 15, 2006, at A18. The
Senate enacted the bill on September 29, 2006, less than a month after the President's
speech. The President signed the Military Commissions Act of 2006 into law on October
17, 2006. See President Bush Signs Military Commissions Act of 2006, supra note 9.
1720 [Vol. 33:5
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III. THE GOVERNMENT'S POSITION BEFORE HAMDAN
Prior to the Supreme Court's holding in Hamdan, the Government
had been acting under the belief that the Geneva Conventions were
inapplicable to al Qaeda detainees. 23  Based on the opinion of White
House attorneys, President Bush announced in February 2002 that
neither Common Article 3, nor the Geneva Conventions, would apply to
the treatment of detainees in the War on Terror.
24
The White House also sought legal advice concerning the treatment
of detainees from the War on Terror in the summer of 2002.25 Believing
that the Geneva Conventions did not apply, the Administration was
concerned with the prohibition on torture under another treaty obligation,
the Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading
Treatment or Punishment.
26
The resulting memo, frequently called the "Torture Memo,"
repeatedly placed emphasis on the high degree of severity necessary for
an act to rise to the level of torture. Testimony from the Senate
23. On January 22, 2002, Jay Bybee, Assistant Attorney General, wrote a memo
concluding that the U.S.'s conflict with al Qaeda did not fit within Common Article 3's
scope of "armed conflicts not of an international character." Memorandum by Jay S.
Bybee, Assistant Attorney General, for Alberto R. Gonzalez, Counsel to the President,
and William J. Haynes II, General Counsel of the Department of Defense, Re:
Application of Treaties and Laws to al Qaeda and Taliban Detainees (January 22, 2002),
available at http://www.gwu.edu/-nsarchiv/
NSAEBB/NSAEBB127/02.01.22.pdf, at 1-2 [hereinafter January 2002 Memo]. Bybee
construed the language "not of an international character" in Common Article 3 to mean
"a war that does not involve cross-border attacks," which excluded the United States's
conflict with al Qaeda. Id. at 6.
24. Memorandum from George W. Bush, President of the United States, to the Vice
President et al., Subject: Humane Treatment of al Qaeda and Taliban Detainees (Feb. 7,
2002), available at http://www.gwu.edu/-nsarchiv/NSAEBB/
NSAEBB127/02.02.07.pdf. The President did determine, however, that the "provisions
of Geneva" would apply to the conflict with the Taliban. Id. at 2.
25. See, e.g., Letter from John C. Yoo, Deputy Assistant Attorney General, to
Alberto Gonzalez, Counsel to the President (Aug. 1, 2002), available at
http://www.gwu.edu/-nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB127/020801.pdf; Memorandum by
Jay S. Bybee, Assistant Attorney General, for Alberto R. Gonzalez, Counsel to the
President, Re: Standards of Conduct for Interrogation under 18 U.S. C. §§ 2340-2340A
(Aug. 1, 2002), available at http://www.gwu.edu/
-nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB 127/02.08.01 .pdf [hereinafter August 2002 Memo].
26. See generally August 2002 Memo, supra note 25. Although analysis of the
Convention Against Torture does not match up directly with Common Article 3 analysis,
it aids in understanding the types of limits the Bush Administration was placing on
interrogations, including the meaning they attached to certain language. The Convention
is domestically codified at 18 U.S.C. §§ 2340-2340A (2000) criminally, and under 28
U.S.C. § 1350 note (2000) to allow for civil damages.
27. See August 2002 Memo, supra note 25, at 16 ("The Reagan
administration.. . determined that [the Convention Against Torture's] definition of
2007)
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hearings on the Convention Against Torture was cited as support. 28 In
the Senate hearings, torture was described as equivalent to "the needle
under the fingernail, application of electrical shock to the genital area,
the piercing of eyeballs, etc." 29 There was also testimony that for acts
causing mental suffering alone to qualify as torture, they must be
"intentional acts such as those designed to damage and destroy the
human personality."
30
Furthermore, domestic courts typically look at "the entire course of
conduct rather than any one act" in determining what constitutes
torture. 31 The following were cited as examples of acts found torturous
in case law: severe beatings using instruments like clubs, mock
executions, threats of imminent death, removing of extremities, burning,
electric shocks to genitalia, rape, and forcing a prisoner to watch the
torture of another. While the Torture Memo's definition of torture has
since been heavily criticized and ultimately repudiated, 33 the examples
of torture it lists are still useful as clear-cut illustrations of torture, though
they should no longer be seen as defining the minimum threshold of
torture.
IV. COMMON ARTICLE 3
The Hamdan decision focused on the use of military commissions
to try detainees. 34 President Bush's subsequent decision to transfer
prisoners out of the secret CIA prisons was based on the broader
implication of Hamdan-that Common Article 3 applied to al Qaeda
torture fell in line with 'United States and international usage, [where it] is usually
reserved for extreme deliberate and unusually cruel practices, for example, sustained
systematic beatings, application of electric currents to sensitive parts of the body and
tying up or hanging in positions that cause extreme pain."').
28. Id. at 19-20.
29. Id. (quoting Mark Richard, Deputy Assistant Attorney General, Criminal
Division, Department of Justice).
30. Id. at 20 (again quoting Richard).
31. Id. at 24. Domestic courts have never convicted a U.S. official of torture under
the Torture Statute or the War Crimes Act, so the only applicable judicial interpretation is
under the Torture Victims Protection Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1350 note (2000) (hereinafter
"TVPA"), which provides a remedy to victims of torture. Id. at 22. There are some
differences between the TVPA and Convention Against Torture, namely TVPA includes
a list of purposes for which torture is conducted, such as obtaining information. Id. at 23.
32. Id. at 24.
33. See Alliance for Justice, Lawyers' Statement on Bush Administration's Torture
Memos (Aug. 4, 2004), available at http://www.afj.org/spotlight/0804statement.pdf
(criticizing the Torture Memo's definition of torture and its "belated repudiation").
34. See 126 S. Ct. 2749, 2798 (2006).
1722 [Vol. 33:5
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detainees. 35  Stating that the application of Common Article 3 to al
Qaeda "put in question the future of the CIA program," President Bush
feared that the secret prisons and the interrogation methods used at these
prisons could be challenged as a violation of Common Article 3.36
A. History and Purpose of Common Article 3
The Geneva Conventions of 1949 were created partially in reaction
to the atrocities committed by the Germans and Japanese during World
War 11. 37 Common Article 3, so named because it is common to all four
Conventions, was adopted as part of the 1949 Conventions. 38 Referred
to as a "Convention in miniature," 39 Common Article 3 was created to
provide a "minimum yardstick" of protection to persons not qualifying
for more comprehensive prisoner-of-war protections.
40
35. See Bush Address, supra note 8.
36. Id. In his speech, President Bush stated:
[Tihe Supreme Court's recent decision has impaired our ability to prosecute
terrorists through military commissions, and has put in question the future of
the CIA program. In its ruling on military commissions, the court determined
that a provision of the Geneva Conventions known as "Common Article Three"
applies to our war with al Qaeda. This article includes provisions that prohibit
"outrages upon personal dignity" and "humiliating and degrading treatment."
The problem is that these and other provisions of Common Article Three are
vague and undefined, and each could be interpreted in different ways by
American or foreign judges. And some believe our military and intelligence
personnel involved in capturing and questioning terrorists could now be at risk
of prosecution under the War Crimes Act-simply for doing their jobs in a
thorough and professional way.
Id.
37. Jennifer R. White, IEEPA 's Override Authority: Potential for a Violation of the
Geneva Conventions' Right to Access for Humanitarian Organizations?, 104 MICH. L.
REV. 2019, 2027 n.50 (2006).
38. See Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded
and Sick in Armed Forces in the Field, adopted Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3114, 3115, 75
U.N.T.S. 31; Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of Wounded,
Sick and Shipwrecked Members of Armed Forces at Sea, adopted Aug. 12, 1949, 6
U.S.T. 3217, 3219, 75 U.N.T.S. 85; Geneva Convention relative to the Treatment of
Prisoners of War, adopted Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3316, 75 U.N.T.S. 135; Geneva
Convention relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, adopted Aug.
12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3516, 3517, 75 U.N.T.S. 287. Common Article 3 is contained in each
of the four Geneva Conventions.
39. INTERNATIONAL COMMITTEE OF THE RED CROSS, COMMENTARY ON THE
CONVENTION (III) RELATIVE TO THE TREATMENT OF PRISONERS OF WAR art. 3, at 34,
available at http://www.icrc.org/ihl.nsf/WebList?ReadForm&id=375&t-com (last visited
Apr. 15, 2007) [hereinafter Official Commentary].
40. See id. at 38 (stating that Common Article 3 is a compulsory minimum of
rights); see also Case Concerning Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against
Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.), 1986 I.C.J. 14, 114 (June 27) ("There is no doubt that, in the
event of international armed conflicts, these rules also constitute a minimum yardstick, in
2007] 1723
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Initially created to protect non-combatants in civil wars, 4 1 Common
Article 3 applies to any "armed conflict not of an international character
occurring in the territory of one of the High Contracting Parties."
42
Unlike other articles of the Geneva Conventions, Common Article 3 does
not contain a reciprocity clause. 43 Thus, its protections are obligatory
upon a party to a conflict regardless of whether the opposing party abides
by them.
44
Common Article 3 states that all persons who qualify for its
protections "shall in all circumstances be treated humanely, without any
adverse distinction founded on race, colour, religion or faith, sex, birth or
wealth, or any other similar criteria." 45  It is to this end-humane
treatment-that the specific prohibitions are to be attained, including the
prohibition of "(a) violence to life and person, in particular murder of all
kinds, mutilation, cruel treatment and torture; (b) taking of hostages; (c)
outrages upon personal dignity, in particular humiliating and degrading
treatment; [and] (d) the passing of sentences ... without previous
judgment pronounced by a regularly constituted court .... ,"
4 6
The touchstone of Common Article 3 is humane treatment, or stated
in the negative, the prohibition of inhuman or inhumane treatment.
47
The American Heritage Dictionary defines "humane" as "[c]haracterized
by kindness, mercy, or compassion."' 4 8  Unfortunately, this definition
does not clearly delineate the boundaries of humane treatment or provide
clear standards for determining which interrogation techniques are
acceptable.
Although humane treatment is not explicitly defined within
Common Article 3,49 it is implicitly defined by what it is not. 50  The
Official Commentary to Common Article 3 states that the specific
prohibitions contained in sections (a) through (c) are offered in
addition to the more elaborate rules which also apply to international conflicts.").
41. See Official Commentary, supra note 39, at 28-29.
42. Common Article 3, supra note 3.
43. Official Commentary, supra note 39, at 37.
44. See id.
45. Common Article 3, supra note 3 (emphasis added).
46. Id.
47. Official Commentary, supra note 39, at 38 (stating that humane treatment is
"the fundamental principle underlying the four Geneva Conventions").
48. THE AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 855 (Joseph
P. Pickett et al. eds., 4th ed. 2000) [hereinafter AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY].
49. See Common Article 3, supra note 3.
50. Official Commentary, supra note 39, at 39 (suggesting that Common Article 3
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contradistinction to "humane" treatment.51 In order to determine what
constitutes inhumane or inhuman treatment, it is necessary to examine
each section of Common Article 3.
B. Cruel Treatment and Torture
Section (a) prohibits "violence to life and person, in particular
murder of all kinds, mutilation, cruel treatment and torture." While
"murder" and "mutilation" are relatively unambiguous, the terms "cruel
treatment" and "torture" are vague. Because Common Article 3 does not
define the terms, it is necessary to examine their ordinary or plain
meaning. 53 The dictionary definition of "cruel" is "[d]isposed to inflict
pain or suffering." 54 This definition, however, does not set a threshold
for the amount of pain or suffering required (i.e., great pain or suffering),
nor does it require any actual pain or suffering.
The International Criminal Tribunal of Yugoslavia (ICTY) has
defined cruel treatment as "an intentional act or omission ... which,
judged objectively, is deliberate and not accidental, which causes serious
mental or physical suffering or injury or constitutes a serious attack on
human dignity." 55  This provides a better standard, requiring an
intentional mens rea, an objective judgment, and the imposition of
serious pain or suffering. However, what constitutes "serious" is still
vague.
Perhaps a better understanding of the phrase "cruel treatment" can
be gained through viewing section (a) as a whole.5 6  Section (a)
expressly prohibits "[v]iolence to life and person, in particular murder of
all kinds, mutilation, cruel treatment and torture." The fact that cruel
51. Id.
52. Common Article 3, supra note 3.
53. See F.D.I.C. v. Meyer, 510 U.S. 471, 476 (1994) ("In the absence of such a
definition, we construe a statutory term in accordance with its ordinary or natural
meaning.").
54. AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY, supra note 48, at 437.
55. Prosecutor v. Kordic & Cerkez, Case No. IT-95-14/2 (Trial Chamber),
Judgment, 265 (Feb. 26, 2001), quoted in Genocide, War Crimes and Crimes Against
Humanity: Topical Digests of the Case Law of the International Criminal Tribunal for
Rwanda and the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, HUMAN
RIGHTS WATCH, http://hrw.org/reports/2004/ij/icty/index.htm (follow "II) War Crimes:
Violations of the Laws and Customs of War (Article 3)" hyperlink; then scroll to "d)
Underlying offenses iii) cruel treatment (1) defined" subheading) (last visited Apr. 15,
2007) [hereinafter Former Yugoslavia Criminal Tribunal Opinions].
56. See United States v. Morton, 467 U.S. 822, 828 (1984) ("We do
not ... construe statutory phrases in isolation; we read statutes as a whole.").
57. Common Article 3, supra note 3. Additionally, the Official Commentary states
that section (a) also prohibits biological experiments from being carried out on detained
2007] 1725
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treatment is listed conjunctively with torture implies that cruel treatment
refers to some sort of mistreatment comparable to torture. While some
commentators assert that cruel treatment refers to treatment falling short
of torture, 58 others argue that cruel treatment does not differ in severity
from torture but only in purpose. 59  In analyzing the severity of
treatment, the ICTY used an objective analysis of the severity of the
harm, as well as subjective analysis of the effect. The case law also
laid out many other factors that may come into consideration:
[T]he nature and context of the infliction of pain, the
premeditation and institutionalisation of the ill-treatment, the
physical condition of the victim, the manner and method used,
and the position of inferiority of the victim. In particular, to
the extent that an individual has been mistreated over a
prolonged period of time, or that he or she has been subjected
to repeated or various forms of mistreatment, the severity of
persons. Official Commentary, supra note 39, at 39. This further demonstrates the high
threshold for inhumane treatment set by section (a).
58. In ICTY decisions, for example, the degree of physical or mental suffering
required for a finding of cruel and inhuman treatment is lower than torture. Prosecutor v.
Kvocka et al., Case No. IT-98-30/1 (Trial Chamber), Judgment, 161 (Nov. 2, 2001),
quoted in Former Yugoslavia Criminal Tribunal Opinions, supra note 55 (under "II) d)
iii) (2) mental suffering requirement lower than for torture" subheading). The language
used in such opinions mirrors those interpreting the Convention Against Torture, which
also considers both the severity of harm and the purpose for which it is inflicted.
Compare id. at 142-43 (under "II) d) i) (3) severe pain and suffering must be inflicted
(element 1)" subheading), with Ireland v. United Kingdom, Case No. 5310/71, 25 Eur.
Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 162 (1978), quoted in DAVID WEISSBRODT, MATERIALS ON TORTURE
AND OTHER ILL-TREATMENT 63 (2005), available at http://wwwl.umn.edu/humanrts/
intlhr/chapterl 9.doc.
59. See Jennifer Moore, Practicing What We Preach: Humane Treatment for
Detainees in the War on Terror, 34 DENV. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 33, 49 (2006) (stating that
torture is no more severe than inhuman treatment but differs in that it is used to extract
information). Support for this proposition can also be found in the elements of war
crimes as used by International Criminal Court (ICC) to interpret and apply article 8 of
the Rome Statute. See INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT, ELEMENTS OF CRIMES,
http://www.un.org/law/icc/asp/Istsession/report/
english/part ii b e.pdf (last visited Apr. 15, 2007). The elements of a prima facie case
encompass each of the prohibited war crimes listed in Common Article 3, including the
war crime of cruel treatment. See id. art. 8(2)(c)(i)-3. The distinctive element for cruel
treatment is "[t]he perpetrator inflicted severe physical or mental pain or suffering upon
one or more persons." Id. The crime of torture contains the same element but further
requires "[t]he perpetrator inflicted the pain or suffering for such purposes as: obtaining
information or a confession, punishment, intimidation or coercion or for any reason based
on discrimination of any kind." Id. art. 8(2)(c)(i)-4. When viewed together, the ICC's
elements of cruel treatment and torture depict cruel treatment as equivalent to torture in
severity, and differing only in purpose.
60. Kvocka et al., supra note 58, at 142-43 (under "II) d) i) (3) severe pain and
suffering must be inflicted" subheading).
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the acts should be assessed as a whole to the extent that it can
be shown that this lasting period or the repetition of acts are
inter-related, follow a pattern or are directed towards the same
prohibited goal.
6 1
Although the terms "cruel treatment" and "torture" are somewhat
amorphous, it is clear that the severity of the pain necessary to establish
either is high.
C. Outrages upon Personal Dignity: Degrading and Humiliating
Treatment
One of President Bush's most prominent objections to the
application of Common Article 3 was the vague prohibition on "outrages
upon dignity." 62 Section (c) prohibits "[o]utrages upon personal dignity,
in particular, humiliating and degrading treatment."6 3  The wording of
this section is certainly general and ambiguous. 64 In viewing section (c)
as a whole, it appears the examples of "humiliating and degrading
treatment" are offered as specific instances of "outrages upon personal
dignity," used to clarify what constitutes an outrage upon personal
dignity.
65
The American Heritage Dictionary defines "dignity" as "the quality
or state of being worthy of esteem or respect" and "inherent nobility and
worth, '66 "humiliate" as "to lower the pride, dignity, or self respect
of,'67 and "degrade" as "to lower in dignity; dishonor or disgrace.., to
61. Prosecutor v. Kmojelac, Case No. IT-97-25 (Trial Chamber), Judgment, 182
(Mar. 15, 2002), quoted in Former Yugoslavia Criminal Tribunal Opinions, supra note 55
(under "II) d) i) (3) severe pain and suffering must be inflicted" subheading). Some of
the acts which the tribunal considered likely to constitute torture were: beatings, sexual
violence, prolonged denial of sleep, food, hygiene, and medical assistance, as well as
threats to torture, rape, or kill relatives. Kvocka et al., supra note 58, at 144 (under "II)
d) i) (7) (a) examples of acts constituting torture" subheading).
62. See, e.g., President George W. Bush, Press Conference of the President
(September 15, 2006), transcript available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/
releases/2006/09/20060915-2.html ("And that Common Article III says that there will be
no outrages upon human dignity. It's very vague. What does that mean, 'outrages upon
human dignity'? That's a statement that is wide open to interpretation.").
63. Common Article 3, supra note 3.
64. See Bush Address, supra note 8 ("Common Article Three... includes
provisions that prohibit 'outrages upon personal dignity' and 'humiliating and degrading
treatment.' The problem is that these ... are vague and undefined, and each could be
interpreted in different ways by American or foreign judges."); see also Official
Commentary, supra note 39, at 39 (explaining that wording of Common Article 3 is
intentionally general).
65. See Common Article 3, supra note 3.
66. AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY, supra note 48, at 507.
67. Id. at 856.
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lower in moral or intellectual character; debase.... 68 The terms
humiliate and degrade both refer to treatment that demeans, embarrasses,
or lowers the dignity of detainees. The ICTY defined this offense as
requiring: "(i) that the accused intentionally committed or participated in
an act or an omission which would be generally considered to cause
serious humiliation, degradation or otherwise be a serious attack on
human dignity, and (ii) that [the actor] knew that the act or omission
could have that effect."
6 9
In analyzing behavior under this standard, the ICTY looked to both
a subjective factor-whether or not the victim had experienced an
outrage on personal dignity-as well as an objective factor-whether
humiliation was so intense that a reasonable person would be outraged.
70
The severity of the humiliation was required to be both real and
serious. 71 The tribunal did not require a minimum temporal harm, but
recognized that fleeting harm would probably not qualify as real and
serious. 72
V. DOES COMMON ARTICLE 3 PROHIBIT THE USE OF SECRET PRISONS?
In his September 6th speech, after admitting the existence of the
secret CIA prison program and announcing the transfer of its current
detainees to Guantanamo Bay, President Bush stated, "[t]he current
transfers mean that there are now no terrorists in the CIA program. But
as more high-ranking terrorists are captured.., having a CIA program
for questioning terrorists will continue to be crucial to getting life-saving
68. Id. at 478.
69. Prosecutor v. Kunarac, Kovac, & Vokovic, Case No. IT-96-23 and IT-96-23/1
(Appeals Chamber), Judgment, 161 (June 12, 2002), quoted in Former Yugoslavia
Criminal Tribunal Opinions, supra note 55 (under "II) d) vi) outrages upon personal
dignity (1) defined" subheading).
70. Id. at 162 (under "II) d) vi) (2) requires humiliation so intense any reasonable
person would be outraged" subheading); Prosecutor v. Aleksovski, Case No. IT-95-14/1
(Trial Chamber), Judgment, 56-57 (June 25, 1999) quoted in Former Yugoslavia
Criminal Tribunal Opinions, supra note 55 (under "II) d) vi) (2) requires humiliation so
intense any reasonable person would be outraged" subheading).
71. Prosecutor v. Kunarac, Kovac, & Vokovic, Case No. IT-96-23 and IT-96-23/11
(Trial Chamber), Judgment, 501 (Feb. 22, 2001) (under "II) d) vi) (3) humiliation must
be real and serious" subheading). Some of the harms the ICTY felt constituted an
outrage on personal dignity included "inappropriate conditions of confinement,"
"performing subservient acts," "being forced to relieve bodily functions in [one's]
clothing," and enduring the "constant fear of being subjected to physical, mental, or
sexual violence." Kvocka et al., supra note 58, at 173 (under "II) d) vi) (8) examples"
subheading).
72. Kunarac, Kovac, & Vokovic, supra note 71, at 501 (under "II) d) vi) (3)
humiliation must be real and serious" subheading).
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information." 73 Later in his speech, President Bush emphasized the need
"to ensure that the CIA program goes forward in a way that follows the
law. ... " ,74 Because President Bush did not foreclose future operation
of the CIA-prison program, it is still pertinent to determine whether
operating a secret-prison program breaches Common Article 3.
The secrecy of this program is meant to discourage attempted
attacks on the prison as well as retribution against the countries in which
they are located. 75  However, within the prisons themselves, the
prisoners are kept in complete isolation from the outside world and have
access to no one except CIA officials. 76  Prisoners have no access to
family, attorneys, or humanitarian organizations such as the Red Cross. 
77
Such isolation borders on solitary confinement, which is generally
prohibited by the Geneva Conventions with regard to prisoners of war
who are awaiting trial. 
78
A. Is Isolation Inhuman Treatment as Defined by Common Article 3?
As previously stated, section (a) prohibits "(a) violence to life and
person, in particular murder of all kinds, mutilation, cruel treatment and
torture." 79 Because isolation is obviously not murder or mutilation, the
prohibitions that deserve the closest analysis within section (a) are those
on cruel treatment and torture.
Initially, isolation from the outside world, falling short of solitary
confinement, should not be considered torture. The potential mental
73. Bush Address, supra note 8.
74. Id.
75. Id. ("[Disclosing information] would provide our enemies with information they
could use to take retribution against our allies and harm our country."); see also Priest,
supra note 2 (noting that disclosure of prison locations might disrupt counterterrorism
efforts in host countries and make them possible targets of terrorist attacks).
76. Priest, supra note 2.
77. Id. Although the Red Cross believed they had access to all the detainees at
Guantanamo Bay, where a CIA secret prison was operating at the time, according to the
Army's report of abuses at Abu Ghraib, the CIA's "ghost detainees," who were held at
Abu Ghraib were "'moved around within the facility to hide them' from Red Cross teams
.... " Dana Priest & Joe Stephens, Secret World of U.S. Interrogation: Long History of
Tactics in Overseas Prisons Is Coming to Light, WASH. POST, May 11, 2004, at Al.
78. Official Commentary, supra note 39, art. 103 ("[C]onfinement while awaiting
trial is merely a measure of security and it must not represent for the accused person a
penalty more severe than a disciplinary punishment. Solitary confinement... is
therefore excluded."). Al Qaeda detainees do not qualify for all the protections
guaranteed to prisoners of war but only those contained in Common Article 3, which
contains no such express prohibition of solitary confinement. See Common Article 3,
supra note 3.
79. Common Article 3, supra note 3.
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anguish caused by such isolation is not nearly as severe as the pain
experienced from "the needle under the fingernail, application of electric
shock to the genital area, and the piercing of eyeballs." 80 Although there
could be forms of torture less severe than these examples, stretching the
definition of torture to include isolation from the outside world would be
too broad and could create a slippery slope. Considering isolation from
the outside world to constitute torture would effectively recognize,
within Common Article 3's prohibition of torture, an affirmative right to
access to the outside world. This, in turn, would present difficult
problems of line drawing in defining exactly how much access to the
outside world detainees are entitled to under Common Article 3.
Furthermore, testimony from Senate hearings stated that for acts
causing mental suffering alone to qualify as torture, they must be
"intentional acts such as those designed to damage and destroy the
human personality." 8 1  Although isolation from friends, family, and
country could emotionally harm detainees, it is not close to the type of
intense mental suffering capable of destroying the human personality.
Therefore, isolation should not be considered torture.
Whether isolation amounts to cruel treatment under section (a)
depends on whether one accepts the International Criminal Court's
definition of cruel treatment as being equal in severity to torture and
differing only in purpose. 82 If one accepts this definition, then isolation
should not be considered either cruel treatment or torture, and therefore
would not violate section (a).
If one accepts the ICTY's position that cruel treatment is less severe
than torture, the question of whether isolation amounts to cruel treatment
is more difficult. In applying the ICTY's factors for determining what
constitutes cruel treatment, it is apparent that the isolation employed in
the CIA's secret prisons is intentional, premeditated and institutionalized,• • 83
and is prolonged over a long period of time. Nonetheless, in viewing
section (a) as a whole, it appears that the drafters intended a very high
threshold for cruel treatment. Murder and mutilation represent the most
severe acts imaginable. While murder, mutilation, and many forms of
torture involve a physical intrusion upon the body, isolation does not.
Thus, considering the context in which "cruel treatment" is used in
80. See supra notes 28-29 and accompanying text.
81. Id. at 20 (quoting Mark Richard, Deputy Assistant Attorney General, Criminal
Division, Department of Justice).
82. See supra note 59 and accompanying text.
83. See Krnojelac, supra note 61, at 182 (under "I1) d) i) (3) severe pain and
suffering must be inflicted" subheading) (listing factors to be considered).
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section (a), isolation should not qualify.
B. Is Isolation an Outrage upon Personal Dignity as Defined by
Common Article 3?
The next section of Common Article 3 that could reasonably
prohibit isolation is section (c). 84 Section (c) prohibits "[o]utrages upon
personal dignity, in particular, humiliating and degrading treatment."
' 85
While the phrase "outrages upon personal dignity" is vague, the text
points to one example of such an outrage: "humiliating and degrading
treatment." If section (c)'s prohibition of "humiliating and degrading
treatment" is interpreted according to its common usage, isolation from
the outside world would not run afoul of this prohibition because such
isolation does not "lower the pride, dignity or self respect of' detainees
or "dishonor or disgrace" them.86 An intuitive example of treatment that
would violate this prohibition is the recently-exposed conduct at the Abu
Ghraib prison in Iraq, where detainees were forced to perform sexual acts
and were photographed nude, smeared with excremen. 87  In contrast,
isolation from the outside world would not demean or embarrass
prisoners in the same sense as forcing them to perform sexually-
demeaning acts or stripping them nude and smearing excrement on them.
While isolation can be a means of applying pressure on prisoners, it does
not do so through embarrassment. Thus, if section (c)'s specific
prohibition of "humiliating and degrading treatment" is interpreted
according to its common usage, it would not prohibit isolation.
A more difficult inquiry is whether isolation from the outside world
constitutes some other form of outrage upon personal dignity. If dignity
is interpreted according to common usage, isolation from the outside
world would not qualify because isolation does not lower "the quality or
state of being worthy of esteem or respect" or "the inherent nobility and
worth" of detainees. 88  If interpreted in this way, even if a particular
detainee subjectively felt his or her inherent nobility and worth were
lowered as a result of being isolated from the outside world, thus meeting
84. Because isolation is not "taking of hostages" as prohibited by section (b),
section (b) does not need to be examined. Similarly, section (d) does not need to be
examined because isolation, at least that taking place during the duration of the conflict,
can not be considered to be the passing of sentences without previous judgment by a
regularly-constituted court.
85. Common Article 3, supra note 3.
86. See supra notes 67-68 and accompanying text.
87. Adam Brookes, New Abu Ghraib Images Stoke U.S. Fears, BBC News,
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middleeast/4718666.stm (last updated Feb. 16, 2006).
88. See supra note 66 and accompanying text.
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the ICTY's subjective component, isolation would fail the ICTY's
objective component because no reasonable prisoner would feel his or
her nobility or worth were lowered as a result of being isolated from the
outside world. Thus, isolation from the outside world most likely does
not violate the plain meaning of section (c).
While there is danger in interpreting Common Article 3 too
narrowly, construing Common Article 3 so broadly as to prohibit
isolation from the outside world would deny countries fair warning of
what is prohibited, give tribunals interpreting it too much discretion to
define the law on an ad hoc basis, and increase the likelihood of arbitrary
enforcement. 89  A domestic criminal statute that used such vague
wording as "cruel treatment" or "outrages upon personal dignity" would
almost certainly be struck down as unconstitutionally vague under the
Due Process Clause. Indeed, such vagueness is what prompted
President Bush to call for Congress to "clarify" Common Article 3.91
Finally, there is reason to think that the framers of the Geneva
Conventions didnot intend isolation to be prohibited by Common Article
3. If the drafters of Common Article 3 meant to prohibit isolation, they
could have included an express prohibition of it. The Official
Commentary to Article 103 generally prohibits solitary confinement with
regard to prisoners of war awaiting trial. 92 The Official Commentary's
express prohibition of solitary confinement with regard to Article 103,
combined with the absence of such an express prohibition with regard to
Common Article 3, raises the presumption that the drafters did not intend
Common Article 3 to prohibit solitary confinement. 93 It follows that if
the drafters of Common Article 3 did not intend Common Article 3 to
prohibit solitary confinement, they certainly would not have intended it
to prohibit mere isolation from the outside world, which falls short of
solitary confinement. Thus, sections (a) through (d) of Common Article
3, when viewed as a whole, most likely do not prohibit isolation from the
89. See Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 108-09 (1972) (discussing
similar policy concerns with respect to vague domestic criminal statutes).
90. See, e.g., Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352, 357 (1983) (holding criminal
statute that required loiterers to provide "credible and reliable" identification
unconstitutionally vague under Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment);
Coates v. Cincinnati, 402 U.S. 611, 615 (1971) (holding criminal statute that prohibited
"annoying" conduct unconstitutionally vague under Due Process Clause of Fourteenth
Amendment).
91. See supra note 8 and accompanying text.
92. Official Commentary, supra note 39, art. 103.
93. See United States v. Barnes, 222 U.S. 513, 518-19 (1912) (espousing the canon
of legislative intent expressio unius est exclusio alterius-the expression of one implies
the exclusion of others not mentioned).
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VI. DO THE INTERROGATION TECHNIQUES VIOLATE COMMON
ARTICLE 3?
The particular interrogation techniques the CIA has been using in
secret prisons have not been officially acknowledged. Nevertheless,
clues indicate the interrogation techniques in use are more severe than
those traditionally used by FBI and military interrogators. 95  In 2005,
both the Director of CIA and Vice President Cheney approached
Congress, during debates over the McCain Amendment, to argue against
a broad prohibition on cruel, inhuman, and degrading treatment. 96  In
2006, the interrogations started to make more and more headlines on
human rights websites and in the press, and many of the techniques have
since been revealed. 
97
The more severe techniques, often called "enhanced techniques,"
listed in documents and reported by the press include: stress positions,
cold celling and induced hypothermia, waterboarding, noise and light• . 98
bombardments, solitary confinement, and sleep deprivation. The
94. As a matter of policy, the drafters of the Geneva Conventions could not have
reasonably foreseen a war, such as the War on Terror, which could potentially last for
decades. Had the drafters foreseen this type of perennial war, which invokes only the
minimal protections of Common Article 3, they may have created higher standards of
protection for such a situation. If the war continues indefinitely, detainees could
potentially be held isolated in secret CIA prisons for the rest of their lives. Moreover, the
isolation and secrecy of the CIA prisons removes public accountability which, in
domestic prisons, is a strong disincentive against prisoner mistreatment. Without outside
oversight, there is not significant protection against the use of torture or other prisoner
mistreatment. At the very least, the secrecy of the CIA prisons fuels public skepticism
about the legality of the interrogation tactics used.
95. For a discussion of FBI and military limitations on interrogation techniques, see
Memorandum from FBI on Legal Analysis of Interrogation Techniques (Nov. 27, 2002);
Memorandum from William J. Haynes II, Counsel for the Department of Defense, to
Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld, on Counter-Resistance Techniques (Dec. 2,
2002); Memorandum from Donald Rumsfeld, Secretary of Defense, on Counter-
Resistance Techniques in the War on Terrorism (Apr. 16, 2003) (describing approved
methods for military interrogations), all available at
http://www.humanrightsfirst.org/us-law/etn/
gov-rep/gov memointlaw.htm (last visited Apr. 15, 2007).
96. Mayer, supra note 1.
97. E.g., Michael Hirsch & Mark Hosenball, The White House: The Politics of
Torture, NEWSWEEK, Sept. 25, 2006; Mayer, supra note 1; Brian Ross & Richard
Esposito, CIA's Harsh Interrogation Techniques Described, ABC NEWS, Nov. 18, 2005,
http://abcnews.go.com/WNT/Investigation/story?id= 1322866.
98. For press reports, see id. Human rights groups have also reported on these
techniques. See, e.g., Amnesty International, Torture and secret detention: Testimony of
the 'disappeared' in the 'war on terror', Aug. 4, 2005,
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interrogation techniques are undoubtedly being used to obtain
information, and thus if severe enough could amount to torture. 99  In
determining whether the techniques could amount to torture, cruel
treatment, or an outrage upon personal dignity, analysis on the nature of
the act and the severity of the harm to the detainee will be
determinative. l00
A. Sensory Manipulation
Noise and light manipulation is reported in government memoranda
as a sensory deprivation technique, but press reports indicate it may be
more common to Rlay music, such as country-western or rap music, into
detainees' cells. 11! It has been reported that, because the music is so
foreign, it has the effect of making the prisoners feel frantic. 102 Possible
side effects of loud noise or lights include an inability to sleep, while
sustained excessive noise may lead to increased stress and risk to mental
health. '03
Despite the existence of side effects, use of the technique would not
constitute a violation unless the severity of any mental or physical effect
rose to a level constituting torture or cruel treatment. Whether cruel
treatment is held to a lower standard than torture or not, 10 4 it seems
unlikely the effects would rise to such a level. Examples of cruel
treatment in international case law, such as use of prisoners as human
http://web.amnesty.org/library/index/ENGAMR511082005 (citing individual accounts);
Human Rights Watch, http://hrw.org/campaigns/torture.htm (featuring links to individual
accounts and legal summaries) (last visited Apr. 15, 2007).
99. See Bush Address, supra note 8 (discussing the importance and value of the
CIA program and that it is obtaining timely and actionable intelligence). For an
international law definition of torture as pain or suffering performed for the purpose of
obtaining information, see ELEMENTS OF CRIMES, supra note 59, art. 8(2)(c)(i)-4; see also
Former Yugoslavia Criminal Tribunal Opinions, supra note 55.
100. See Kunarac, Kovac, & Vokovic, supra note 69, at 153-56 (under "II) d) i)
(4)" subheading) (explaining severity is the distinguishing factor in determining war
crimes violations).
101. Memorandum from FBI, supra note 95; Memorandum from Haynes, supra note
95. See Ross & Esposito, supra note 97 (describing reports of Afghani prisoners who
claim music from rap artist Eminem was played in their cells); Amnesty International,
supra note 98 (reporting individual accounts claiming western music was played 24 hours
a day for an entire month).
102. Ross & Esposito, supra note 97.
103. Inmates of Occoqran v. Barry, 844 F.2d 828, 830 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (citing an
expert's testimony that constant and loud televisions in prison dormitory could have
harmful effects); United States v. Marzook, 435 F. Supp. 2d 708, 736 (N.D. I11. 2006)
(involving prisoners in an Israeli prison prevented from sleep by playing loud music).
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shields, 1o5 are far more severe.
There may be a stronger case that this practice constitutes an
outrage on personal dignity. 10 6  The ICTY did find "inappropriate
conditions of confinement" to be an outrage on personal dignity.
10 7
However the tribunal also required that conditions result in mental




A stress position involves placing a detainee in an uncomfortable
position, often forcing them to stand, for prolonged periods of time. 109
The FBI has limited use of the technique to a maximum of four hours. 
1 10
CIA prisoners, however, have described being forced "to stand,
handcuffed and with their feet shackled to an eye bolt in the floor for
more than 40 hours," and report that it frequently results in exhaustion
and sleep deprivation as well. "'1
Stress positions are designed to cause physical pain. When
analyzing the use of stress positions, international courts have considered
factors such as the nature and context of the infliction of pain, the
premeditation and institutionalization of the treatment, the physical
condition of the victim, the manner and method used, and the position of
inferiority of the victim. 112 International court opinions have ruled stress
positions to cause sufficient physical and mental pain and suffering for a
finding of cruel treatment, although they are typically analyzed in
105. Kvocka et al, supra note 58, at 161 (under "II) d) iii) (4)" subheading).
106. Kunarac, Kovac and Vokovic, supra note 69, at 162 (under "II) d) vi) (2)"
subheading); Aleksovski, supra note 70, at 9 56-57 (under "II) d) vi) (2)" subheading).
107. Kvocka et al, supra note 58, at 173 (under "II) d) vi) (8)" subheading).
108. Kunarac, Kovac and Vokovic, supra note 71, at 501 (under "II) d) vi) (3)"
subheading). A domestic court applying Common Article 3 would probably be even less
willing to find this to be a violation. One U.S. court has declared that loud televisions
playing in prisoners' dormitories are "a far cry" from a violation of the prisoners' Eighth
Amendment protections against cruel treatment. Inmates of Occoquan, 844 F.2d at 837
(denying a cruel treatment claim by prisoners whose claim was based on constant loud
television noise). They are unlikely to extend greater protection to a high-level terrorist.
109. This position is described as "Long Time Standing" in Ross & Esposito, supra
note 97; see also Memorandum from FBI, supra note 95. There are specific accounts
that describe positions which are more uncomfortable. See, e.g., Mayer, supra note 1.
110. Memorandum from FBI, supra note 95, at 1.
111. Ross & Esposito, supra note 97. The combination of stress positions and
injuries are reported to have caused the death of at least one detainee. Mayer, supra note
1.
112. Krnojelac, supra note 61, at 182 (under "II) d) i) (3)" subheading).
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conjunction with other confinement conditions. 113  More to the point,
one international committee has criticized the United States's use of
stress positions and "short shackling" on detainees in the War on Terror,
stating that the use is cruel and inhuman treatment in violation of the
Convention Against Torture. 11
4
If a court treated cruel treatment as the ICTY did, holding it to be
less severe than torture, 1 1 5 then such a prolonged use of a stress position
may violate Common Article 3. However, a finding of cruel treatment
still requires pain and suffering to be severe and not temporary.
Ultimately, whether this technique violates Common Article 3 must
depend on the circumstances, length, and consequences of its use.
C. Sleep Deprivation
Sleep deprivation is likely to occur in conjunction with many of the
techniques that are being considered here. Sleep deprivation was
reportedly achieved by housing detainees in cold cells without bunks,
and using sensory overload and constant interruptions. 116 The CIA has
reportedly subjected detainees to sleep deprivation for weeks at a
time. 117
Sleep deprivation is an old and common form of coercing a
detainee. 118 It has been described as creating a need or desire for sleep
stronger than the urge for food or water. 119 Some evidence shows that
113. See, e.g., Ireland v. United Kingdom, 1978 Y.B. EUR. CONY. ON H.R. 602; Pub.
Comm. Against Torture in Israel v. Israel, reprinted in 38 I.L.M. 1471 (1999).
114. COMM. AGAINST TORTURE, CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE
COMMITTEE AGAINST TORTURE 7, (May 18, 2006), available at http://www.aclu.org/
images/torture/asset-upload file807_25607.pdf.
115. For a discussion of competing theories, see supra notes 58-60 and
accompanying text.
116. See, e.g., Human Rights Watch, U.S. Operated Secret 'Dark Prison' in Kabul,
Dec. 19, 2005, http://hrw.org/english/docs/2005/12/19/afghan12319.htm (stating that
various detainees claim to have been deprived of sleep due to shackling, cold, and noise);
Ross & Esposito, supra note 97 (reporting an escaped prisoner as saying, "They would
not let you rest, day or night. Stand up, sit down, stand up, sit down. Don't sleep. Don't
lie on the floor.").
117. See Human Rights Watch, U.S. Operated Secret 'Dark Prison' in Kabul, supra
note 116.
118. See, e.g., Human Rights Watch, Descriptions of Techniques Allegedly
Authorized by the CIA, Nov. 11, 2005, http://hrw.org/english/docs/2005/l 1/21/
usdoml2071.htm (containing description of use of sleep deprivation in both Soviet and
North Korean Gulags). Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld approved a limited use of this
technique for the military in which the detainee's schedule was simply altered from day
to night. Memorandum from Rumsfeld, supra note 95, at 4 (emphasizing that it was not
a sleep deprivation technique).
119. Human Rights Watch, Descriptions of Techniques Allegedly Authorized by the
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sleep deprivation causes cognitive impairment, decreased pain tolerance,
and possible hypertension and other cardiovascular disease.' 20 The
ICTY did cite "prolonged denial of sleep" as likely to constitute
torture. 12 1 On the other hand, there is little evidence of lasting harm
created by sleep deprivation. 122 The stronger argument may be that it
causes serious, although somewhat transitory, physical and mental
suffering, and thus constitutes a serious attack on human dignity.
123
However, the lack of permanent physical or mental harm may militate
against a violation of Common Article 3.
D. Solitary Confinement
The serious health consequences of solitary confinement have been
thoroughly documented and long recognized by courts. 124 While the use
of solitary confinement was limited in military and FBI analyses to a
period no longer than thirty days, 125 reports indicate the CIA may keep
detainees in solitary confinement for a year or more.126 Depending on
CIA, supra note 118 (containing the statement by Former Israeli Prime Minister
Menachem Begin that, "In the head of the interrogated prisoner a haze begins to
form ... and he has one sole desire: to sleep, to sleep just a little, not to get up, to lie, to
rest, to forget.... Anyone who has experienced this desire knows that not even hunger or
thirst are comparable with it .... I came across prisoners who signed what they were
ordered to sign, only to get what the interrogator promised them. He did not promise
them their liberty. He promised them--if they signed-uninterrupted sleep!").
120. PHYSICIANS FOR HUMAN RIGHTS, BREAK THEM DOwN: SYSTEMATIC USE OF
PSYCHOLOGICAL TORTURE BY US FORCES 69-70 (2005), available at
http://physiciansforhumanrights.org/library/documents/reports/break-them-down-the.pdf.
121. Kvocka, supra note 58, at 144 (under "II) d) i) 7) (a)" subheading).
122. PHYSICIANS FOR HUMAN RIGHTS, supra note 120, at 69-70 (noting temporary
but not necessarily any permanent harmful effects of sleep deprivation).
123. Kvocka, supra note 58, at 172 ("The focus of violations of dignity is primarily
on acts, omission, or words that do not necessarily involve long-term physical harm, but
which nevertheless are serious offences deserving of punishment.") (under "II) d) vi) (4)"
subheading).
124. In 1890, the Supreme Court heard In re Medley, 134 U.S. 160 (1890). The
Court stated, "A considerable number of the prisoners fell, after even a short
confinement, into a semi-fatuous condition, from which it was next to impossible to
arouse them, and others became violently insane; others still, committed suicide; while
those who stood the ordeal better were not generally reformed, and in most cases did not
recover sufficient mental activity to be of any subsequent service to the community." Id.
at 168. For an examination of the psychological impact and legal implications of solitary
confinement, see Craig Haney & Mona Lynch, Regulating Prisons of the Future: A
Psychological Analysis of Supermax and Solitary Confinement, 23 N.Y.U. REv. L. &
SOC. CHANGE 477 (1997).
125. Memorandum from FBI, supra note 95; Memorandum from Haynes, supra note
95.
126. See, e.g., Amnesty International, supra note 98 (stating that individuals report
being held in CIA custody in solitary confinement for approximately a year and a half).
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the length of confinement, as well as the extent of the deprivation of
communication, a prisoner may face visual disturbances,
psychopathological disorders, depression, anxiety, and loss of cognitive
and memory function, during and after confinement. 1
27
Objectively, extensive use of solitary confinement has the potential
to cause significant mental harm. International case law also looks to the
subjective effects on the particular victim. 128  Whether use of the
technique would rise to the level of torture, or cruel treatment if treated
as a lesser standard, depends largely on whether the particular victim
experienced non-transitory mental harm. 129  In fact, at least one
international court has also held prolonged solitary confinement to be
inhuman treatment and a violation of Common Article 3.130
E. Cold Ceiling
Cold celling, also known as induced hypothermia, is achieved by
leaving a detainee naked in a cell which is kept at a temperature around
fifty degrees Fahrenheit and periodically dousing him with water.
131
Individual reports indicate some cells can be even colder, approximately
at refrigeration temperatures, and that individuals are left in the cold cells
without bunk or blanket. '
32
127. Haney & Lynch, supra note 124, at 500-10. It is useful for interrogations
because the need for sensory and human interaction frequently causes detainees to look
forward to interrogations and want to talk. See id. at 504.
128. Krnojelac, supra note 61, at 182 (under "II) d) i) (3)" subheading).
129. Kvocka, supra note 58, at 149; Kunarac, Kovac and Vokovic, supra note 71,
at 501.
130. Velisquez Rodriguez Case, Judgment of July 29, 1988, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (Ser.
C) No. 4, reprinted in 28 I.L.M. 291 (1989), cited in WEISSBRODT, supra note 58, at 67.
A domestic court is less likely to find such a violation. Solitary confinement is used
regularly in the U.S. criminal prison system, and is generally upheld by domestic courts
as constitutionally viable. See, e.g., Sostre v. McGinnis, 442 F.2d 178, 192 (2d Cir.
1971) (describing solitary confinement as one of "the main traditional disciplinary tools
of our prison systems"). When considering the constitutionality of solitary confinement
and "strip cells" in U.S. prisons, courts generally balance the length of time against the
conditions of the imprisonment. See Hutto v. Finney, 437 U.S. 678, 686-87 (1978) (a
seminal case stating that the confinement "might be tolerable for a few days and
intolerably cruel for weeks and months"); Gibson v. Lynch, 652 F.2d 348 (3d Cir. 1981)
(discussing prisoner's claim that confinement was cruel and unusual punishment).
131. Ross & Esposito, supra note 97. It is called "Exposure to cold weather or water
(with medical monitoring)" in government memoranda. Memorandum from FBI, supra
note 95, at 1; Memorandum from Haynes, supra note 95, at 13.
132. See, e.g., Mayer, supra note 1; David Johnston, At a Secret Interrogation,
Dispute Flared Over Tactics, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 10, 2006 (stating that the detainee at
times seemed to turn blue from the cold). This technique is reported to have resulted in at
least one death. Priest, supra note 2, at A4.
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GHOST DETAINEES
Cold celling seems more likely to be treated as a violation of
Common Article 3 than the previous techniques. 133  Because
hypothermia can be deadly, it certainly places a detainee in a grave
situation. 134 Cold celling has resulted in at least one death when applied
improperly, and certainly can be expected to lead to physical and mental
suffering. Whether the technique would amount to a violation may
depend on whether cruel treatment was treated as less severe or equal to
torture. 136 However, if applied severely enough that the detainee was
near organ failure or death, it would certainly rise to the level of torture
even under the more extreme definitions of that term. 137 Because the
detainees are left naked and shivering, there is also a strong argument it
would constitute an outrage on personal dignity. 1
38
F. Waterboarding
Waterboarding is alleged to be the most extreme measure used by
CIA interrogators. It is a technique in which the prisoner is "bound to
an inclined board, feet raised and head slightly below the feet.
Cellophane is wrapped over the prisoner's face and water is poured over
him.' ' 4n  The effectiveness of the technique relies on creating in the
133. See Elci & Others v. Turkey, App. No. 23145/93, Eur. Ct. H.R. (Mar. 24, 2003),
at 54, available at http://www.echr.coe.int/ (victim was tortured by being stripped,
insulted, hosed down with cold water, causing probable hypothermia). See also Kvocka,
supra note 58, at 144 (denial of medical care and hygiene as commonly listed varieties
of torture).
134. Ross & Esposito, supra note 97.
135. Id. A prisoner in a Soviet gulag, left in cold and hungry for a prolonged period
of time, describes feeling like he was in a semi-conscious state and an automaton.
Human Rights Watch, Descriptions of Techniques Allegedly Authorized by the CIA,
supra note 118 (under "Exposure to cold").
136. See supra Part IV.B-C (discussing the differing interpretations of Common
Article 3). Domestic courts have found exposure to similar temperatures, even without
the water dousing, to violate a prisoner's constitutional right not to be subjected to cruel
treatment. See, e.g., Murphy v. Walker, 51 F.3d 714, 720-21 (7th Cir. 1995)
(confinement in cold cell without clothes and heat for a week and a half in the middle of
November); Lewis v. Lane, 816 F.2d 1165, 1171 (7th Cir. 1987) (claim that prison
administrators allowed cell temperatures to fall at times to between 52 and 54 degrees
remanded for further proceedings). Eighth Amendment claims, however, do have some
substantial differences from Common Article 3 violation claims.
137. See August 2002 Memo, supra note 25, at 1 (defining severe pain or suffering
as pain equivalent to serious physical injury, such as organ failure).
138. Urinating and defecating on oneself have been found to be an outrage on
personal dignity. Kvocka, supra note 58, at 173 (under "II) d) vi) (8)" subheading).
Extreme exposure to cold may be similarly degrading.
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mind of the detainee the feeling of drowning, essentially operating as a
mock execution. 141 Mental health professionals report mock executions
to have significant mental effects on detainees. 142 Mock executions have
been cited by both domestic and international authorities as constituting
torture. 143
VII. CONCLUSION
President Bush has emphasized the importance of the CIA
interrogation program to the War on Terror. 144 The MCA was passed, in
part, to ensure that CIA activities could continue. 145 Enactment of the
MCA, however, does not absolve the U.S. from its duty to the
international community to uphold its treaty obligations under the
Geneva Conventions. 146- If the CIA continues its secret-prison program,
it appears that the use of isolation would not constitute per se breaches of
Common Article 3. However, some of the enhanced interrogation
techniques tread the line of permissibility under Common Article 3.
Ultimately, there may have been some purpose to the vague wording in
Common Article 3-it may deter governments from treading so closely.
Either way, Vice President Cheney's prediction that the U.S. would have
to "go to the dark side" does not seem far off.
141. Human Rights Watch, Descriptions of Techniques Allegedly Authorized by CIA,
supra note 118.
142. PHYSICIANS FOR HUMAN RIGHTS, supra note 120, at 54-55 (2005).
143. For domestic cases, see, e.g., Price v. Socialist People's Libyan Arab
Jamahiriya, 384 F. Supp. 2d 120, 126 (D.D.C. 2005) (describing mock executions
performed by firing empty gun); Orantes-Hernandez v. Meese, 685 F. Supp. 1488, 1492
(C.D. Cal. 1988) (categorizing mock executions as torture). For an example of an
international court decision, see Ilascu & Others v. Moldova & Russia, App. No.
48787/99, Eur. Ct. H.R. (July 8, 2004), at 435, available at http://www.echr.coe.int/.
144. Bush Address, supra note 8.
145. Id.
146. See discussion supra note 12.
1740 [Vol. 33:5
24
William Mitchell Law Review, Vol. 33, Iss. 5 [2007], Art. 13
http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/wmlr/vol33/iss5/13
